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1 . 0  INTRODUCTION 
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This repor t  contains  a discussion of t he  s i g n i f i c a n t  anomalies t h a t  
occurred during the  Apollo 17 mission. The discussion i s  divided i n t o  
f i v e  major sec t ions  : command and service modules, l u n a r  module, govern- 
ment-furnished equipment, l u n a r  surface experiments, and o r b i t a l  experi-  
ments. A l l  t i m e s  are elapsed time from range zero, e s t a b l i s h e d  as t h e  
i n t e g r a l  second before  l i f t - o f f .  
2 
2.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE ANOMALIES 
2 .1  SPURIOUS MASTER ALARMS 
Several  spurious master alarms without t h e  accompanying caut ion and 
warning l i g h t s  were r epor t ed  a f te r  e a r t h  o r b i t  i n s e r t i o n .  The alarms 
could be i n i t i a t e d  by tapping on panel  2 ,  i n d i c a t i n g  a shor t  c i r c u i t  t o  
ground i n  t h a t  panel.  
P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  i s  i n  progress t o  determine t h e  cause. 
The panel has been removed f o r  f u r t h e r  inspect ion.  
To d a t e ,  
t e s t i n g  of t h e  panel shows normal operat ion without any spurious master 
alarms. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.2 MISSION TIMER SLOW 
The mission t i m e r  i n  t he  lower equipment bay w a s  1 5  seconds slow a t  
1 minute and 58 seconds a f te r  l i f t - o f f ,  The t imer  w a s  r e s e t  and worked 
properly for t h e  remainder of t h e  mission. 
P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  has been performed on t h e  t imer  with negat ive re-  
sults. The c i r c u i t r y  has been analyzed t o  determine poss ib l e  causes of  
t h e  time loss wi th  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e  most probable cause i s  an i n t e r -  
m i t t e n t  i n  one of t he  i n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t s  w i th in  t h e  timer. 
Since t h e r e  i s  another mission t imer  on panel  2 and event timers i n  
t h e  lower equipment bay as we l l  as on pane l  1, l o s s  of one t imer  i s  no t  
mission c r i t i c a l .  Therefore,  no f’urther a c t i o n  w i l l  be taken. 
This anomaly i s  closed.  
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2.3 RETRACT LIMIT SWITCH ON LUNAR SOUNDER HF 
ANTENNA BOOM 1 DID NOT ACTUATE 
The r e t r a c t  l i m i t  sensing switch on HF antenna boom 1 f a i l e d  t o  op- 
erate ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t e l eme t ry  and command module d i s p l a y  d a t a  t h a t  i nd i -  
ca t ed  t h e  boom had not f u l l y  r e t r a c t e d .  
The boom w a s  one of two HF antennas, each u t i l i z i n g  two nes t ed  
0.008-inch by 4.00-inch s t ee l  elements t o  form an ex tendab le / r e t r ac t ab le  
t u b u l a r  antenna 410 inches i n  l eng th .  Two l i m i t  switches were used, one 
t o  sense extension,  and t h e  o the r  t o  sense r e t r a c t i o n .  Each microswitch 
w a s  operated by a cam which w a s  ro t a t ed  by a spring-loaded cam follower 
a r m .  This a r m  had a r o l l e r  at  i t s  t i p  t h a t  rode on t h e  su r face  of t h e  
antenna element during extension o r  r e t r a c t i o n  (see f i g .  2-1). One ele- 
ment had a s l o t  punched a t  i t s  t i p  and another near  t h e  r o o t .  Each s l o t  
w a s  a l i gned  with one of t h e  two arms so t h a t  at t h e  appropr i a t e  extension 
l e n g t h ,  t h e  fol lower a r m  dropped i n t o  t h e  s l o t  and r o t a t e d  t h e  cam t o  ac- 
t u a t e  t h e  l i m i t  switch.  
Current data ind ica t ed  t h a t  t h e  antenna d i d  f u l l y  r e t r a c t  ; i . e .  , 
t h a t  t h e  motor s t a l l e d  a f t e r  r e t r a c t i n g  f o r  a nominal per iod.  This ve r i -  
f ied  t h e  antenca motor/gear box / r e t r ac to r  mechanism w a s  s a t i s f a c t o r y  and 
i s o l a t e d  t h e  problem t o  t h e  r e t r a c t  l i m i t  switch and i t s  a c t u a t i n g  mech- 
anism. Possible  fa i lure  modes of t h i s  device include t h e  following: 
a. F r i c t i o n  or a de fec t ive  spring on t h e  l i m i t  switch cam fol lower 
a r m .  
b. Misalignment (or indexing)  of t h e  cam fol lower a r m  w i th  t h e  hole 
i n  t h e  element. 
e. L i m i t  switch (microswitch) assembly malfunction. 
Figure 2-1 shows t h e  torque ava i l ab le  i n  t h e  s p r i n g  and t h e  torque 
r equ i r ed  t o  r o t a t e  t h e  cam. A t  t h e  nominal p o s i t i o n  angle  f o r  cap tu re  by 
t h e  element,  t h e r e  i s  a p o s i t i v e  margin of 8 t o  1. 
f r i c t i o n  i s  not considered a possible  cause. The remaining f a i l u r e  modes 
have been i n v e s t i g a t e d  without e s t ab l i sh ing  a most l i k e l y  cause. However, 
s ince  t h i s  device i s  not t o  be flown on f u t u r e  missions,  no f k r t h e r  a c t i o n  
i s  required.  
Therefore ,  increased 
This  anomaly i s  closed. 
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Figure 2-1.- L im i t  switch. 
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2.4 LUNAR SOUNDER HF ANTENNA BOOM 2 
DEPLOYMENT WAS SLOWER THAN EXPECTED 
Extension o f  t h e  l u n a r  sounder HF antenna boom 2 a t  approximately 
191:38 r equ i r ed  more t i m e  than expected. 
imately one-half deployment. Motion was re-establ ished by cyc l ing  power 
u n t i l  t h e  u n i t  f u l l y  deployed. Subsequent extensions repeated t h e  con- 
d i t i o n .  
The motor s t a l l e d  after approx- 
The two halves  of t h e  "bi-stem" antenna were s t o r e d  on two spools 
which were simultaneously driven t o  extend o r  r e t r a c t  t h e  elements through 
t h e  guide/antenna forming assembly. 
Current d a t a  shows t h a t  l oad  on the motor w a s  g r e a t e r  than expected. 
Review of  t h e  design has revealed no p a r t s  o r  components p a r t i c u l a r l y  sen- 
s i t i v e  t o  a thermal/vacuum environment, but  t h e  cu r ren t  s i g n a t u r e s  ind i -  
c a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  an a d d i t i o n a l  load on t h e  system. A s  t h e  guide/an- 
tenna forming assembly i s  t h e  predominant f r i c t i o n  source i n  t h e  mechanism, 
t h i s  i s  considered t h e  most l i k e l y  source of  t h e  problem. Fur the r ,  t h e  
increased load  r e s u l t e d  i n  an increase of motor cu r ren t  r equ i r ed  which 
lowers t h e  t e rmina l  vol tage , motor speed, and t h e r e f o r e  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  
f r i c t i o n  load  due t o  slowdown of t h e  element unspooling. The varying 
h igh - f r i c t ion  loading i n  a thermal/vacuum environment i s  a phenomenon 
which has been experienced previously on Apollo. 
N o  f u r t h e r  a n a l y s i s  w i l l  be performed s ince  t h e  assembly i s  not pro- 
grammed f o r  use on f u t u r e  missions.  
This anomaly i s  closed. 
2.5 ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM ACCELEROMETER BIAS SHIFT 
The e n t r y  monitor system accelerometer n u l l  b i a s  s h i f t e d  p r i o r  t o  
P r i o r  t o  t h e  midcourse 
t h e  t r a n s e a r t h  midcourse co r rec t ion  maneuver. Throughout t h e  mission 
t h e  b i a s  w a s  measured t o  be p l u s  0.01 f t / s e c 2 .  
c o r r e c t i o n  it measured plus 0.66 f t / s e c 2 .  
measured t o  be p l u s  0.20 f t / s e c 2 .  
A f t e r  t h e  maneuver it w a s  
During s t e p  1 of t h e  system t e s t  p r i o r  t o  e n t r y ,  t h e  0.05-g l i g h t  
i l l umina ted  when it should not have. This i nd ica t ed  an a c c e l e r a t i o n  l e v e l  
g r e a t e r  than 0.05-g when no such acce le ra t ion  l e v e l  w a s  p re sen t .  This w a s  
caused by a l a r g e  accelerometer n u l l  b i a s  as ind ica t ed  i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  b'ias 
tes ts .  Entry procedures f o r  using the e n t r y  monitor system were r ev i sed  
t o  preclude t h e  0.05-g l i g h t  from coming on prematurely and t h e  system 
worked normally during en t ry .  
6 
The s c r o l l  w a s  removed from t h e  spacec ra f t  and found t o  be normal. 
The system w i l l  be removed and t e s t e d  t o  i s o l a t e  t he  f a u l t  t o  e i t h e r  an 
accelerometer problem or an e l e c t r o n i c s  problem. The expected comple- 
t i o n  date i s  February 16,  1973. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.6 CHLORINE AMPULE LEAKED 
During t h e  d a i l y  water c h l o r i n a t i o n  ope ra t ions ,  leakage w a s  observed 
i n  and around t h e  casing assembly of t h e  i n j e c t o r  mechanism. D i f f i c u l t y  
i n  advancing ( r o t a t i n g )  t h e  knob assembly a l s o  was noted occas iona l ly  and 
appeared t o  improve when t h e  i n j e c t o r  w a s  disengaged and r e i n s t a l l e d .  
Some of the ampule bags had extruded p a s t  t h e  base p l a t e  although none 
appeared t o  have broken. 
A t o t a l  of 13 chlor ine ampules and 13 b u f f e r  ampules were used dur- 
i n g  t h e  mission. P o s t f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  showed t h a t  s i x  of t h e  expended chlo- 
r i n e  ampules and f i v e  of t h e  expended b u f f e r  ampules had bladder  l e a k s .  
I n  f o u r  of t h e s e  eleven ampules, t h e  bladders  were extruded pas t  t h e  base- 
p l a t  e.  
Examination showed t h a t  t h e  o u t e r  needle of t h e  i n j e c t o r  needle as- 
sembly was bent  and poss ib ly  formed a leakage pa th  when pene t r a t ing  t h e  
ampule grommets a t  an angle ( f i g .  2-2).  During p o s t f l i g h t  t e s t i n g ,  t h r e e  
i n j e c t i o n s  were accomplished with no l e a k s  caused by t h e  bent needle.  
Additional p o s t f l i g h t  examination of t h e  ampules and i n j e c t o r  system i s  
p resen t ly  i n  progress .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.7 MAPPING CAMERA REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
PLUME SHIELD DOOR FAILED TO CLOSE 
Photographic d a t a  taken from t h e  l u n a r  module during rendezvous shows 
t h e  mapping camera r e a c t i o n  con t ro l  system plume s h i e l d  door i n  t h e  open 
p o s i t i o n  with t h e  mapping camera apparent ly  r e t r a c t e d .  
The door i s  a t t ached  t o  t h e  spacec ra f t  with a hinge t h a t  i nc ludes  a 
t o r s i o n  spr ing t o  c lose t h e  door when t h e  camera i s  r e t r a c t e d  ( f i g .  2-3).  
The door i s  pushed open by t h e  camera when it i s  deployed. The photo- - 
graphs show t h e  camera t o  be f u l l y  r e t r a c t e d  which i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  
problem i s  with t h e  door i t s e l f .  
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Other mechanical systems anomalies have occurred on Apollo 1 5 ,  16  
and 17 which suggests  a common f a c t o r  which i s  as yet unknown. I n  a l l  
ca ses ,  some degree of s l i d i n g  between metal s u r f a c e s  w a s  r equ i r ed ,  which 
i s  t h e  case with t h e  door hinge. It is t h e r e f o r e  conceivable t h a t  t h e  
f r i c t i o n  between these  su r faces  may have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y  increased 
by t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  space environment, and t h e s e  e f f e c t s  have not  been 
dup l i ca t ed  i n  ground t e s t i n g .  
Since t h i s  w a s  t h e  las t  mission for t h i s  dev ice ,  no f u r t h e r  a c t i o n  
w i l l  be taken. 
This anomaly i s  closed. 
2.8 PRESSURE OPERATING DEADBAND FOR HYDROGEN 
TANKS 1 AND 2 SHIFTED 
Cryogenic hydrogen system operation w a s  normal u n t i l  approximately 
12 hours.  
creased from about 1 6  p s i  (238-254 p s i )  t o  approximatley 3 p s i  (244-247 p s i )  
by 13 hours ( f i g .  2-4) and continued i n  t h i s  mode u n t i l  automatic hea te r  
ope ra t ion  f o r  tanks 1 and 2 w a s  terminated a t  about 1 5  hours. Automatic 
h e a t e r  operat ion w a s  resumed i n  tanks 1 and 2 at about 24 hours. 
about f i v e  automatic hea te r  cycles  (all normal) occurred i n  t anks  1 and 2 
before  approximately 71 hours because t h e  f a n s  were i n  t h e  automatic mode 
i n  t ank  3, and t h e  tank 3 pres su re  switch con t ro l l ed  a t  a higher  p re s su re  
than t anks  1 and 2. A t  t h a t  t ime,  the t ank  3 f a n s  were turned off and 
t h e  ope ra t ing  p res su re  deadband again decayed t o  3 p s i  (248-251 p s i )  as 
shown i n  f i g u r e  2-4. This deadband was maintained u n t i l  automatic h e a t e r  
ope ra t ion  w a s  terminated i n  tanks 1 and 2 at 87 hours. Hydrogen system 
p res su re  w a s  maintained f o r  t h e  remainder of t h e  mission by use of man- 
u a l  f a n  operat ion i n  tanks 1 and 2 and automatic f an  operat ion i n  tank 3. 
Hydrogen system operat ion w a s  normal i n  t h i s  mode. 
The operat ing pressure range (deadband) a f te r  t h i s  t i m e  de- 
Only 
Ind iv idua l  p re s su re  switches monitor p re s su res  i n  tanks 1 and 2 as 
shown i n  f i g u r e  2-5. When automatic h e a t e r  or f an  operat ion i s  s e l e c t e d ,  
both switches must be i n  t h e  low-pressure p o s i t i o n  t o  apply power t o  t h e  
h e a t e r s  or f ans  i n  each tank. When e i t h e r  switch t r a n s f e r s  t o  t h e  high 
p res su re  p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  motor switch t r a n s f e r s  and removes power from t h e  
h e a t e r s  and fans.  Figure 2-6 i s  a cutaway sketch of one of t h e  p re s su re  
switches i n  t h e  low-pressure pos i t i on .  
Decreasing or r e s t r i c t i n g  the  full'downward t ravel  of t h e  s t o p  w i l l  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  p re s su re  at which t h e  sha f t  t r a n s f e r s  t o  t h e  upper p o s i t i o n .  
Decreasing or r e s t r i c t i n g  the  f u l l  upward t r a v e l  of t h e  s t o p  will decrease 
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t h e  p re s su re  at which t h e  s h a f t  t r a n s f e r s  t o  t h e  lower p o s i t i o n .  Conse- 
quen t ly ,  hard p a r t i c l e s  f l o a t i n g  i n  t h e  s t o p  mechanism area shown i n  f i g -  
u re  2-6 can have a v a r i a b l e  e f f e c t  which can appear and disappear  depend- 
i n g  on t h e  l o c a t i o n  of t h e  f l o a t i n g  p a r t i c l e s .  
The s i z e  of t he  p a r t i c l e s  required t o  change t h e  pressure s e t t i n g s  
i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l .  The f u l l  t r a v e l  of t h e  s t o p  may be as s m a l l  as 
0.007 inch. The pressure change t o  move from one s t o p  t o  t h e  o t h e r  i s  
about 1 5  p s i .  Consequently, t he  upper l i m i t  can be reduced t o  about 
7 p s i  with a p i ece  of metal  about 0.004-inch i n  s i z e  between t h e  s t o p  on 
t h e  s h a f t  and t h e  upper case s top.  
The t o g g l e  p l a t e s  are pin-joined t o  t h e  s h a f t  a t  one end and t o  a 
horseshoe-shaped spr ing at the  other end as shown i n  f i g u r e  2-6. 
are formed i n  t h e  opposi te  edges o f  t h e  togg le  p l a t e s  by a coining oper- 
a t i o n .  Figure 2-7 shows t h e  toggle p l a t e  taken from a switch which w a s  
disassembled f o r  i n spec t ion .  I n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  b u r r s  were found t h a t  
were about t o  break o f f .  The p a r t i c l e s  could then move around and be- 
come t rapped i n  t h e  s tops  under zero-gravity condi t ions.  
Grooves 
Other poss ib l e  mechanisms a re  being i n v e s t i g a t e d ;  however, t h e  par- 
t i c l e  contamination mechanism does s a t i s f y  a l l  of t h e  p e c u l i a r  f l i g h t  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
2.9 TEMPORARY DROPOUT OF SEVERAL INSTRUMENTATION PARAMETERS 
Dropout of  35 conmand and se rv ice  module measurements occurred be- 
tween 191:40:39 and 191:42:32. Data i n d i c a t e d  t h e  problem e x i s t e d  on t h e  
downlink s i g n a l .  There i s  no commonality with these  measurements i n  re-  
gard t o  pu l se  code modulation input connectors,  instrumentat ion J-box, or 
umbi l i ca l  feed-throughs. The pulse code modulation assembly w i l l  be re- 
moved from t h e  spacecraf t  and t e s t e d  i n  t h e  l a b o r a t o r y ,  while being sub- 
j e c t e d  t o  shock and v i b r a t i o n ,  t o  explore  f o r  poss ib l e  p a r t i c l e  contam- 
i n a t i o n  i n  a component p a r t .  A c i r c u i t  a n a l y s i s  i s  a l s o  being performed 
t o  determine what poss ib l e  f a i l u r e  mode could produce t h e  problem. The 
expected completion date  i s  February 8,  1973. 
This anomaly i s  open. 
Burrs on l i p  r 
Figure 2-7 .- Pressure switch toggle plate. 
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2.10 WATER/GLYCOL TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE FAILED 
TO MAINTAIN THE EVAPORATOR TEMPERATURE 
During four  e a r l y  luna r  o r b i t  revolu t ions ,  t h e  water /glycol  temper- 
a t u r e  c o n t r o l  valve f a i l e d  t o  open properly as t h e  r a d i a t o r  o u t l e t  tem- 
pe ra tu re  decreased. 
much as 4' F below t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  con t ro l  band of 42O t o  4 8 O  F during 
mixing s t a r t u p .  
The mixed coolant temperature momentarily f e l l  as 
N o  co r rec t ive  ac t ion  was taken and i n i t i a t i o n  of mixing was proper 
during a l l  subsequent lunar o r b i t s  and during t r a n s e a r t h  coas t .  The sys- 
tem behavior i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  some s l i g h t  s t i c k i n g  occurred i n  the  valve 
gear  t r a i n  a f t e r  having been driven hard aga ins t  t h e  full closed s top  
during the  hot  po r t ions  of t h e  lunar  o r b i t s .  A l a r g e r  than normal tem- 
pe ra tu re  e r r o r  and modulated e l e c t r i c a l  s i g n a l  t o  t h e  valve were requi red  
t o  f r e e  t h e  gear  t r a i n  so t h a t  t h e  valve would start t o  d r ive  open. 
During checkout on previous spacecraf t ,  t hese  va lves  have occasion- 
a l l y  s tuck  when driven hard aga ins t  e i t h e r  t h e  full  open or full closed 
s top .  Manual disengagement of t h e  valve c lu t ch  mechanism r e l i e v e s  t h e  
back pressure  on the  gears  and f r e e s  the  gear  t r a i n .  This occurred dur- 
i ng  checkout on the  Apollo 17 valve and w a s  accepted f o r  f l i g h t  because 
of t h e  manual operat ion c a p a b i l i t y  and demonstration of  manual opera t ion  
during t h e  Apollo 16 mission. 
Dimensional checks have shown t h a t  t he  p i t c h  c i r c l e s  of two of t he  
gear  p a i r s  i n  t h e  valve gear  t r a i n  are not tangent  ( f i g .  2-8). This re- 
s u l t s  i n  s l i d i n g  r a t h e r  than r o l l i n g  ac t ion  between contac t ing  t e e t h .  
One va lve  which previously experienced the  same s t i c k i n g  has been d i s -  
assembled and the  gears  showed no abnormal wear, although t h e  dry l u b r i -  
cant was  scraped o f f  t h e  gear  t e e t h  i n  t he  a r e a  of tooth-to-tooth contac t .  
S l i d i n g  f r i c t i o n  between the  unlubricated gear  t e e t h  may have been high 
enough t o  cause t h e  s t i c k i n g  experienced. 
Since manual valve operat ion i s  s a t i s f a c t o r y  f o r  f u t u r e  misssions,  
no f u r t h e r  ac t ion  w i l l  be taken.  
This anomaly i s  closed.  
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Figure 2-8.- 'hter/glyCOl temperature control valve gear drive. 
3.0 LUNAR MODULE ANOMALIES 
3.1 BATTERY 4 VOLTAGE READING WAS LOWER 
THAN THAT OF BATTERY 3 
A t  approximately 108:06, t he  lunar  module b a t t e r y  3 and b a t t e r y  4 
vo l t age  d a t a  i n d i c a t e d  a voltage d i f fe rence  of approximately 0.5 v o l t ,  
with b a t t e r y  3 vol tage g r e a t e r  than t h a t  of b a t t e r y  4. 
t e r y  3 and 4 voltages  were equal.  
Previously,  bat-  
B a t t e r i e s  3 and 4 a re  p a r a l l e l  and should r e f l e c t  equal  vo l tages .  
Reverse current  from b a t t e r y  3 t o  b a t t e r y  4 would have been i n d i c a t e d  by 
t h e  reverse  current  t r i g g e r i n g  the  b a t t e r y  malfunction l i g h t .  This alarm 
i s  t r i g g e r e d  by reverse  cur ren t  of more than 1 0  amperes f o r  4 t o  6 sec- 
onds which w a s  exceeded by b a t t e r y  4 curren t  readouts .  The b a t t e r y  cur- 
r en t  measurement does not i n d i c a t e  current d i r e c t i o n .  Since no a l a r m  oc- 
cur red ,  b a t t e r y  4 w a s  de l iver ing  pos i t ive  cur ren t  t o  the  bus,  i n d i c a t i n g  
t h a t  t h e  b a t t e r y  4 voltage readout was not a t r u e  reading. This 0.5-volt 
d i f f e rence  also appeared on the  b a t t e r y  open c i r c u i t  vol tages .  
The b a t t e r y  4 voltage measurement’is conditioned by a s i g n a l  condi- 
t i o n e r  which c o n s i s t s  of an input  r e s i s t i v e  d i v i d e r  network feeding a 
dc-to-dc converter ( f i g .  3-1). An increase of r e s i s t a n c e  of 1 percent i n  
t h i s  network can account f o r  the  observed change. Another p o s s i b i l i t y  of  
f a i l u r e  e x i s t s  i n  t h e  zero-adjust network. 
0 
This anomaly i s  closed. 
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Figure 3-1 .- Voltage measurement circuitry. 0 
4.0 GOVERN MENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT ANOMALIES 
4.1 NO EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY WARNING TONE I N  
COMMAND MODULE PILOT'S COMMUNICATIONS CARRIER 
A t  253 :44, during prepara t ion  and checkout f o r  t h e  t r a n s e a r t h  coas t  
ex t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t y ,  t he  Command Module P i l o t  could not hear  t h e  cau- 
t i o n  and warning tone i n  h i s  communications c a r r i e r ,  al though his t r ans -  
mission and recept ion  were apparently normal. For t h e  ex t ravehicu lar  
a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  Command Module P i l o t  used t h e  Lunar Module P i l o t ' s  communi- 
ca t ions  c a r r i e r  which operated normally, inc luding  the  caut ion and warn- 
i n g  tones .  
Af te r  t he  ex t ravehicu lar  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  Command Module P i l o t  p a r t i a l l y  
removed t h e  s leeve  covering h i s  communications c a r r i e r  e l e c t r i c a l  p i g t a i l  
and found t h a t  of t h e  nine leads  ( twis ted  sh ie lded  p a i r s )  making up t h e  
p i g t a i l s ,  two were broken ( f i g .  4-1). 
P o s t f l i g h t  d i scuss ions  with the Command Module P i l o t  i nd ica t ed  t h a t  
t h e  p i g t a i l  l e a d  became twi s t ed  and wound up t o  the  poin t  of kno t t ing  due 
t o  h i s  t w i s t i n g  and tu rn ing  while performing h i s  normal cabin func t ions .  
Addi t iona l ly ,  t h e  Command Module P i l o t  d i d  not wear the  i n f l i g h t  cover- 
all garment and the  constant  wear garment e l e c t r i c a l  harness w a s  not re- 
s t r a i n e d .  I n  t h i s  conf igura t ion ,  twis t ing  of t h e  l eads  i s  poss ib le  and 
could l e a d  t o  t h e  failure observed. 
0 
Fa i lu re  ana lys i s  of t h e  returned f l i g h t  i tem has shown t h a t  t h e  
f a i l e d  wires  were broken about 1/4 inch below t h e i r  exi t  po in t  from t h e  
p o t t i n g  of t h e  f l e x  r e l i e f  a t tached t o  t h e  lower end of t h e  communications 
c a r r i e r  s p l i c e  block. 
ad jacent  s e t  of wires  i n  a braided configurat ion.  The func t ions  c a r r i e d  
by t h e s e  wires  were caution/warning tone and l e f t  earphone c i r c u i t s .  
The break occurred where these  wires l a y  across  an 
Repeated t w i s t i n g  and knot t ing of similar wire bundles t o  t h e  ex ten t  
descr ibed by t h e  crewman has demonstrated t h a t  t h e  point  of breakage w a s  
i nhe ren t ly  t h e  most highly loaded due t o  t h e  geometry of t h e  p i g t a i l ,  and 
thereby  w a s  subjec t  t o  f l e x / t e n s i l e  f a i l u r e .  
Skylab t r a i n i n g  and f l i g h t  procedures a r e  being rev ised  t o  r e f l e c t  
a harness  configurat ion t h a t  prevents t he  t w i s t i n g  of t he  wire harness .  
This anomaly i s  closed.  
20 
Figure 4-1.- Communications carrier wire failures. 
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5.0 LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT ANOMALIES 
5.1 LUNAR SURFACE GRAVIMETER SENSOR BEAM CANNOT BE 
STABILIZED I N  TKE NULL POSITION 
Centering t h e  sensor beam capaci tor  p l a t e  i n  t h e  proper s t a b l e  posi-  
t i o n  between t h e  f i x e d  capac i to r  p l a t e s  ( f i g .  5-1) could not be accom- 
p l i s h e d  following t h e  i n i t i a l  experiment turn-on. When t h e  command w a s  
given t o  add any or all of  t h e  masses t o  the  sensor  beam assembly, t h e  
d a t a  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  beam would not move away from t h e  upper c a p a c i t o r  
p l a t e .  The only way t o  b r ing  t h e  beam down w a s  by caging it aga ins t  t h e  
lower c a p a c i t o r  p l a t e .  
For normal ope ra t ion ,  t h e  sensor beam must be h o r i z o n t a l ,  wi th  t h e  
c a p a c i t o r  end-plate centered between t h e  two f i x e d  capac i to r  p l a t e s .  Ad- 
justment of  t h e  suspension point  of the sensor s p r i n g  and t h e  a d d i t i o n  and 
removal of i nd iv idua l  masses a r e  provided t o  assist i n  cen te r ing  t h e  beam 
i n  i t s  reference p o s i t i o n  , equ id i s t an t  between t h e  two capac i to r  p l a t e s .  
Small changes i n  t h e  v e r t i c a l  component of l o c a l  g r a v i t y  t end  t o  d i s p l a c e  
t h e  beam upward or downward. 
The displacement i s  sensed as a capaci tance change between t h e  c e n t e r  
o r  beam p l a t e  and each of t h e  two f ixed ou t s ide  p l a t e s .  A vol tage propor- 
t i o n a l  t o  t h i s  displacement i s  generated by t h e  capacitance change and in-  
t e g r a t e d  t o  supply a feedback voltage which e l e c t r o s t a t i c a l l y  f o r c e s  t h e  
beam p l a t e  back t o  t h e  cen te r  of t he  gap. 
Review of  sensor  records revealed t h a t  a mathematical e r r o r  r e s u l t e d  
i n  t h e  sensor mass weights being about 2 percent  l i g h t e r  than t h e  proper 
nominal weight f o r  1/6-g operat ion of t h e  f l i g h t  u n i t .  The sensor mech- 
anism allows up t o  only 21.5 percent adjustment from t h e  nominal by ground 
c a l c u l a t i o n s  from 1-g t o  1/6-g mass f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  u n i t  by inc lud ing  an 
erroneous value i n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  from the  uncorrected c a l c u l a t i o n s  f o r  
t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  u n i t .  
t command f o r  poss ib l e  inaccuracies .  The e r r o r  was made i n  t h e  conversion 
Because t h e  mass weights do not provide enough downward f o r c e ,  t h e  
beam has been balanced and centered by applying a load  on t h e  beam through 
t h e  mass support sp r ings .  This i s  accomplished by s p e c i a l  caging of t h e  
m a s s  weight assembly with ground commands t o  t h e  mass cage motor as shown 
i n  figure 5-1. I n  t h i s  configurat ion,  t h e  mass s p r i n g  permits balance o f  
t h e  beam and func t ion  of t he  instrument.  However, t h e  sp r ing  constant  o f  
t h e  mass s p r i n g  considerably reduces t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  of t h e  system. 
This anomaly i s  closed. 
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Figure 5-1, - Lunar surface gravimeter sensor beam centering . 
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5.2 SURFACE ELECTRICAL PROPERTIES RECEIVER 
TEMPERATURE HIGHER THAN PREDICTED 
The r ece ive r  temperature w a s  about 5' F l e s s  than normal at  t h e  end 
of t h e  f irst  ex t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t y  as shown i n  f i g u r e  5-2. However, 
during t h e  r e s t  per iod  between t h e  f i rs t  and second ex t r aveh icu la r  ac t iv -  
i t i e s ,  t h e  temperature rose t o  80' F ins t ead  of dropping t o  about minus 
1 4 O  F as predic ted .  Between t h e  second and t h i r d  ex t r aveh icu la r  ac t iv -  
i t i e s ,  t h e  temperature dropped about 8' F i n s t e a d  of t he  expected drop 
of about 50' t o  60° F. 
The r e c e i v e r  w a s  p ro t ec t ed  by a mul t i layered  aluminized Kapton the r -  
m a l  bag ( f i g .  5-3) .  The thermal bag had two f l a p s  (of t h e  same material)  
which p ro tec t ed  t h e  o p t i c a l  s o l a r  r e f l e c t o r  (mirror) on t o p  of t he  re-  
ce ive r  from luna r  dust accumulation. A dust  film of about 1 0  percent  on 
t h e  mirror sur face  could result i n  the ind ica t ed  degradat ion of thermal  
c o n t r o l  and a f i lm  of t h i s  amount would not normally be v i s i b l e  t o  t h e  
crew. 
Folding back one, or bo th ,  f l a p s  during r e s t  per iods  w a s  t o  r e s u l t  
i n  cool ing  of t he  r ece ive r  by r ad ia t ion  of hea t  energy t o  deep space. 
With system normal e f f i c i e n c y ,  and the  experiment turned o f f ,  opening t h e  
t a b  A cover ( f i g .  5-3) at the  end of the  f i r s t  ex t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t y  
should have r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  pred ic ted  temperature drop t o  about minus 
14' F by the  s tar t  of t he  second ex t ravehicu lar  a c t i v i t y .  
t h e  A and B f l a p s  w a s  provided for cont ingencies  r e q u i r i n g  more r a p i d  
cool ing.  
Opening both 0 
This procedure w a s  used throughout t he  remainder of t h e  mission. 
C 
Cover design depended upon Velcro s t r a p s  and pads t o  hold the  Kapton 
f l a p s  t i g h t l y  c losed t o  keep out dust and sun l igh t  ( f i g .  5-3) .  The Velcro 
p i l e  pad w a s  bonded t o  the  Kapton bag and t h e  Velcro hook s t r a p  was bonded 
t o  t h e  Kapton f l a p s .  
ready f a i l e d  before  t h e  Lunar Module P i l o t  configured the  r ece ive r  a t  t h e  
end of t h e  f irst  ex t r aveh icu la r  a c t i v i t y  , t hus  r e s u l t i n g  i n  dust  accumula- 
t i o n  on the  mirror su r face  under both f l a p s .  The bond of t he  Velcro pads 
t o  t h e  Kapton f a i l e d ,  l eav ing  no t r ace  of t he  adhesive on the  Kapton, and 
t h e  pads remained a t t ached  t o  the  s t r aps .  
B bonding ma te r i a l  s p e c i f i e d  was  supposedly acceptab le  f o r  bonding Velcro 
t o  Kapton. 
The bond of the Velcro pads f o r  both f l a p s  had al- 
The p o l p r e t h a n e  FR-127 A and 
The bonding procedures used are being inves t iga t ed .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
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5.3 LUNAR EJECTA AND METEORITE EXPERIMENT 
TEMPERATURE HIGH 
The temperature of t h e  l u n a r  e j e c t a  and me teo r i t e  experiment w a s  
higher  t han  predicted during t h e  first and second l u n a r  days ( f i g .  5-4).  
The high temperatures occurred with a l l  combinations of experiment modes: 
on, o f f ,  and standby, with all dust  covers on, with only t h e  senso r  covers 
on, and with all covers o f f .  Whenever t h e  experiment was i n  t h e  "operate- 
on" mode, t h e  science d a t a  i n d i c a t e d  normal operat ion of  t h e  experiment. 
The m a x i m u m  allowable temperature for survival of t h e  e l e c t r o n i c  compo- 
nen t s  has not been exceeded; however, it w a s  necessary t o  command t h e  ex- 
periment from "operate-on" t o  "off" at a sun angle of about 153 degrees 
during t h e  f irst  luna r  day and at  a sun angle  of about 16 degrees during 
t h e  second luna r  day. 
pe ra tu re  rose from 0' F at 0' sun angle t o  about 168' F a t  15' sun angle  
( f i g .  5-4). The instrument was commanded t o  standby and then  t o  o f f  be- 
cause t h e  temperature continued t o  r i s e .  I n  t h e  off mode, with no power 
t o  t h e  instrument,  t h e  temperature r i s e  rate w a s  lower. 
Following s u n r i s e  of t h e  second lunar day, t h e  t e m -  
I nves t iga t ions  are being made of t h e  thermal c o n t r o l  system, cover 
and cover r e l ease  system and p o s s i b l e  e f f e c t s  on t h e  thermal c o n t r o l  sys- 
tem, e f f e c t  of exposed sensor  surfaces ' ,  ins t rumentat ion c i r c u i t r y  d a t a  
from t h e  times of cover removal commands, and poss ib l e  phenomena associ-  
a t e d  with lunar  sun r i se  and sunset  and t h i s  instrument.  
This anomaly i s  open. 
5.4 CASK DOME REMOVAL WAS DIFFICULT 
The Lunar Module P i l o t  was not ab le  t o  remove t h e  cask dome wi th  t h e  
removal t o o l .  
The socket on the  removal t o o l  can engage t h e  nut on t h e  dome before  
t h e  p ins  on the t o o l  lock i n t o  t h e  r eces s  i n  t h e  dome ( f i g .  5-5). The 
Lunar Module P i l o t  d id  not v e r i f y  t h a t  t h e  p i n s  were locked. I n  t h i s  
conf igu ra t ion ,  r o t a t i n g  t h e  t o o l  clockwise w i l l  r o t a t e  t h e  nut on t h e  
dome. 
as noted by the crew. This r e l e a s e  allows t h e  dome t o  r o t a t e  when t h e  
t o o l  i s  r o t a t e d  another 60 degrees ,  t hus  disengaging t h e  threaded dome/ 
cask i n t e r f a c e .  However, with t h e  p ins  not locked i n t o  t h e  dome r e c e s s ,  
t h e  dome could be cocked, bu t  not  withdrawn. The dome was e a s i l y  wedged 
o f f  t h e  cask with the  hammer. The sequence can be dup l i ca t ed  wi th  e i t h e r  
broken p ins  o r  by incomplete i n s e r t i o n  and locking of t h e  t o o l  p ins .  
A 90-degree r o t a t i o n  of t h e  nut r e l e a s e s  t h e  dome r e t a i n i n g  s t r a p s ,  
4 
200 
160 
100 
80 
. 60 
d anqle of 220 degrees 
10  ' ?  
I 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 
Sun angle, deg 
Figure 5-4.- Lunar ejecta and meteorite experiment temperature data. 
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Figure 5-5.- Fuel  cask dome release mechanism. 
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No f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  will be performed s i n c e  t h e  cask Will not  
be flown on future missions.  
This anomaly i s  closed.  
5.5 BACKGROUND NOISE I N  THE LUNAR ATMOSPHERIC 
COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT DATA 
A zero o f f s e t  was noted i n  p a r t  of t h e  l u n a r  atmospheric composition 
experiment d a t a  on t h e  mid-mass and low-mass channels ( f i g .  5-6). 
o f f s e t  w a s  t h e  result of background noise.  
This 
Commanding t h e  sensor ion sources on and o f f ,  or t h e  sensor e l e c t r o n  
The presence of  t h e  m u l t i p l i e r s  on o r  o f f  does not a f f e c t  t h e  condi t ion.  
o f f s e t  i s ,  however, a f f e c t e d  by the vol tage level t o  t h e  sensors .  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  cross-coupling between unshielded high vol tage wires and 
unshielded c o l l e c t o r s  i n  t h e  sensor package i s  being inves t iga t ed .  
The 
The problem has caused no loss  of  data .  
This anomaly i s  open. 
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F igure 5-6.- Zero of fset  i n  lunar atmospheric composit ion experiment data. 
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6.0 ORBITAL EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT ANOMALIES 
6.1 PANORAMIC CAMERA VELOCITY /ALTITUDE SENSOR 
OPEFUITED ERRATICALLY 
Telemetry d a t a  from the  second panoramic camera pass on r evo lu t ion  13 
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  v e l o c i t y / a l t i t u d e  sensor output  w a s  e r r a t i c .  
l o c i t y / a l t i t u d e  sensor  measured t h e  rate of t ravel  of t h e  spacec ra f t  r e l -  
at ive t o  t h e  l u n a r  su r face .  The output s i g n a l  from t h e  sensor ( f i g .  6-1) 
c o n t r o l s  t h e  cycl ing ra te  of  t he  camera and t h e  forward motion compensa- 
t i o n ,  as w e l l  as t h e  exposure s ince  the  width of  t h e  exposure s l i t  i s  de- 
pendent upon t h e  scanning r a t e  of the l e n s .  The sensor  ope ra t e s  i n  t h e  
range from 45 t o  80 miles a l t i t u d e .  An ove r r ide  switch i n  t h e  spacec ra f t  
provides  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  locking out t h e  sensor  and s u b s t i t u t i n g  pre- 
set  vol tages  which correspond t o  r a t e s  f o r  t h e  55- and 60-mile a l t i t u d e s .  
The ve- 
I n  accordance with t h e  f l i g h t  plan,  t he  v e l o c i t y / a l t i t u d e  sensor  w a s  
not  used during t h e  f i rs t  panoramic camera ope ra t ing  pe r iod ;  i n s t e a d ,  t h e  
ove r r ide  switch was used t o  s u b s t i t u t e  a p rese l ec t ed  v e l o c i t y / a l t i t u d e  
value and thereby achieve t h e  desired forward motion compensation. The 
sensor  w a s  used i n  t h e  normal mode during t h e  second camera ope ra t ing  
pe r iod ,  but due t o  an i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  normal mode was ope ra t ing  er- 
r a t i c a l l y ,  t h e  overr ide c a p a b i l i t y  was used f o r  t h e  remainder of t h e  
mission. 
0 
Data a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the e r r a t i c  operat ion may have r e s u l t e d  
from a downward s h i f t  i n  t h e  sca l ing  of t h e  sensor output s i g n a l .  I f  so ,  
t h e  s h i f t  w a s  most l i k e l y  caused by a component failure wi th in  the  sensor  
c i r c u i t r y .  Because t h i s  w a s  the last mission f o r  t h e  panoramic camera, 
no f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i s  required.  ' 
This anomaly i s  closed.  
6.2 MAPPING CAMERA EXPOSURE PULSE ABSENT AT LOW LIGHT LEVELS 
One of t h e  mapping camera te lemetry channels i nco rpora t e s  a pulse  
whose presence each t i m e  t h e  f i lm  i s  exposed confirms t h a t  l i g h t  has been 
t r a n s m i t t e d  through t h e  metr ic  l e n s  and s h u t t e r  t o  t h e  film. This expo- 
su re  pu l se  fa i led t o  appear at t h e  lower l i g h t  levels.  
The pulse  i s  generated by a l i g h t  sensor  and a s soc ia t ed  a m p l i f i e r  . 
and a one-shot mul t iv ib ra to r  ( f i g .  6-2). The l i g h t  sensor c o n s i s t s  of  
four photo diodes,  with one near each edge of t h e  4-1/2 by 4-1/2 inch  
p i c t u r e  format ( f i g .  6-3). All four diodes are connected i n  s e r i e s .  
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During Apollo 1 5  and 16 ,  t h i s  pulse  w a s  absent only at the  very low 
l i g h t  l e v e l s ,  thereby i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  Apollo 17 discrepancy may have 
been due t o  a th re sho ld  s h i f t  i n  the l i g h t  sensor  c i r c u i t r y .  
s t r i p  of met r ic  photography from revolu t ion  62 was  processed i n  order  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  whether t h i s  w a s  t he  case or some o the r  problem w a s  a c t u a l l y  
reducing t h e  l i g h t  being t r ansmi t t ed  t o  the  f i lm.  
A 50-foot 
The t e s t  s t r i p  ind ica t ed  t h a t  the  film had been proper ly  exposed, 
t hus  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  l i g h t  sensor c i r c u i t r y  had indeed experienced 
a th re sho ld  s h i f t .  This s h i r t  could have been t h e  r e s u l t  of a photo d i -  
ode f a i l u r e  or a change i n  t h e  performance of t h e  a m p l i f i e r ,  t h e  one-shot 
m u l t i v i b r a t o r ,  o r  t he  c i r c u i t r y  between these  two elements.  
Since t h i s  w a s  t he  last  mission f o r  t h i s  camera, no f u r t h e r  a n a l y s i s  
w i l l  be accomplished. 
This anomaly i s  closed.  
6.3 PANORAMIC CAMERA GIMBAL DRIVE FAILURE 
The panoramic camera l o s t  i t s  s t e r e o  c a p a b i l i t y  8 minutes p r i o r  t o  0 completion of i t s  f i n a l  photographic pass  i n  l u n a r  o r b i t .  
S te reo  photography i s  achieved by gimbaling t h e  l e n s  assembly f o r e  
and af% between exposures so t h a t  one p i c t u r e  of a s t e r e o  p a i r  i s  taken 
wi th  t h e  l e n s  viewing ahead of the  nad i r  and t h e  o the r  p i c t u r e  i s  taken 
wi th  t h e  l e n s  po in t ing  behind t h e  nadi r .  
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  l e n s  assembly had ceased t o  gimbal ( f i g .  6-4). These 
were the  forward motion compensation tachometer vo l t age  and the  automatic 
exposure command vol tage .  Monographic photography cont inued,  but  it w a s  
degraded somewhat by the  assoc ia ted  l o s s  of forward motion compensation 
t h a t  i s  achieved by slowly gimbaling t h e  l e n s  during f i lm  exposure. 
Two independent te lemet ry  p o i n t s  
This i n a b i l i t y  t o  gimbal t he  l ens  system w a s  apparent ly  t h e  r e s u l t  
of a f a i l u r e  i n  e i t h e r  t he  gimbal drive motor o r  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t r y  
t h a t  provides  power t o  the  motor. 
s i n c e  i t s  brushes a r e  l i m i t e d  l i f e  items. 
It i s  most l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  motor f a i l e d ,  
Since t h i s  w a s  t he  l a s t  mission f o r  t h i s  camera, no f u r t h e r  ana lys i s  
w i l l  be performed. 
This anomaly i s  c losed .  
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6.4 ULTRAVIOLET SPECTROMETER TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT FAILURES 
Both u l t r a v i o l e t  spectrometer  i n t e r n a l  temperature  measurements 
( e l e c t r o n i c s  and motor) f a i l e d  simultaneously near  t h e  end of t he  mission 
a t  approximately 282 : 20 .  
t rometer  increased  about 10  milliamps (approximately 4 p e r c e n t ) .  Since 
t h e s e  temperatures  were f o r  housekeeping purposes and t h e i r  c i r c u i t r y  i s  
independent of t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  da t a  c i r c u i t r y ,  t h e i r  f a i l u r e  d id  not af- 
f e c t  t h e  performance of t he  u l t r a v i o l e t  spectrometer  sc ience  mission. An 
e x t e r n a l  temperature  measurement a t tached t o  t h e  instrument case continued 
t o  provide thermal s t a t u s  a f t e r  the  l o s s  of t he  i n t e r n a l  measurements. 
A t  t he  same time , t he  input  cur ren t  t o  t h e  spec- 
A block diagram of the  temperature sensing c i r c u i t s  i s  shown i n  f i g -  
ure  6-5. Each thermis tor  temperature sensor  i s  connected t o  i t s  own b r idge  
network which i n  t u r n  d r ives  a d-c ope ra t iona l  ampl i f i e r  whose 0- t o  5-volt 
output  i s  then te lemetered.  Both temperature c i r c u i t s  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  and 
independent except t h a t :  (1) they  share  common r e t u r n s ,  ( 2 )  t hey  share  
common +15 v o l t  power supp l i e s ,  and (3 )  each br idge  network i s  b iased  wi th  
a common p lus  1-vol t  p rec i s ion  s t a b l e  re ference .  The p l u s  1-vol t  r e f e r -  
ence is  der ived v i a  a tempera ture-s tab i l ized  zener diode and an i n v e r t i n g  
d-c ampl i f i e r  powered from t h e  minus l5-vol t  supply. 
A t  t h e  time of f a i l u r e ,  t he  temperature i n d i c a t i o n s  changed dramat- 
i c a l l y  i n  a 1-second i n t e r v a l .  Such a change w a s  not  cons i s t en t  with t h e  
thermal  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  u l t r a v i o l e t  spectrometer .  Since t h e  p r i -  
mary ind ica t ions  were t h e  f a i l e d  temperature channels coupled with t h e  
s l i g h t  increase  i n  input  cu r ren t ,  it i s  most l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  oc- 
cur red  i n  one of  t h e  c i r c u i t s  common t o  t h e  temperature  s i g n a l  cond i t ione r s .  
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Fur ther  ana lyses  and t e s t i n g  with the  prototype u l t r a v i o l e t  spectrom- 
e t e r  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t he  anomaly was apparent ly  t h e  r e s u l t  of a failure of 
a component o r  a s h o r t  i n  t he  c i r c u i t  wi r ing  i n  the  1-vol t  re fe rence  v o l t -  
age or t he  minus l5-vol t  supply vol tage.  
Since t h i s  w a s  t he  only mission f o r  t h i s  ins t rument ,  no f u r t h e r  
a n a l y s i s  w i l l  be accomplished. 
This anomaly i s  closed.  
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Figure 6-5.- Block diagram of ultraviolet spectrometer temperature sensing circuits. 
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6.5 MAPPING CAMERA DEPMY/RETRACT TIMES WERE EXCESSIVE 
The f i r s t  and t h i r d  extensions o f  t h e  mapping camera were nominal, 
bu t  a l l  o t h e r  deploy and r e t r a c t  times were longer  than  expected. The 
behavior was q u i t e  similar t o  t h a t  during t h e  Apollo 1 5  and 16 missions.  
The cause of t h e  Apollo 1 5  and 16 anomalies has not been i d e n t i f i e d ,  
but  as a result of extensive i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  several precaut ionary f i x e s  
had been implemented, such as removal of  t h e  no-back device,  improved con- 
taminat ion covers ,  and a change i n  t h e  l u b r i c a n t  on t h e  d r i v e  screw - 
all apparent ly  t o  no a v a i l .  
Dynamic t e s t i n g  i n  support  of  the Apollo 1 5  and 16  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  
included thermal-vacuum and simulated zero-g tes t s .  These tes ts  provided 
no c lues  t o  explain t h e  s lugg i sh  behavior of t h e  deployment mechanism. 
E i t h e r  t hese  t e s t s  were not capable of s u f f i c i e n t l y  s imulat ing t h e  scien- 
t i f i c  instrument module bay environment o r  m o t h e r ,  as y e t  unknown, fac- 
t o r  w a s  involved. 
Other anomalies have occurred with s c i e n t i f i c  instrument module bay 
equipments, thus suggest ing a common f a c t o r .  The mapping camera r e a c t i o n  
c o n t r o l  system plume s h i e l d  d i d  no t  properly c lose  on Apollo 15 and 17, 
and t h e  mapping camera s t e l l a r  glare  shade f a i l e d  t o  r e t r a c t  on Apollo 16. 
The l u n a r  sounder high frequency antenna exh ib i t ed  s lugg i sh  deployment on 
Apollo 17. I n  a l l  cases, some degree of s l i d i n g  between metal  su r f aces  
was required.  It i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  conceivable t h a t  t h e  f r i c t i o n  between 
those su r faces  may have been s i g n i f i c a n t l y  increased by t h e  e f f e c t s  of  a 
hard vacuum t h a t  i s  unobtainable i n  ground t e s t i n g .  
* 
Since t h i s  w a s  t h e  last mission f o r  th i s  device.  no f u r t h e r  ana lys i s  
w i l l  be  performed. 
This anomaly i s  closed. 
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